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Fresh embryos resulting from in vitro fertilization, including many of poor quality, can provide sources of
human embryonic stem cell lines. We consider why some donate such embryos for this research, address
relevant ethical and policy issues, and present core guidelines for fresh embryo donation based on those
of Canada.Introduction
Stem cell investigators have sought to augment the availability
and diversity of the pool of human embryonic stem cell (hESC)
lines ever since the initial generation and culture of such lines
from human embryos in 1998 (Thomson et al., 1998). They
have developed new hESC lines on feeder cells not subject to
contamination by animal viruses in order to avoid possible trans-
mission of animal pathogens to patients through transplanted
hESCs or their progeny (Amit et al., 2003). They have also gener-
ated new hESC lines that express more diverse histocompatibil-
ity antigens than those currently available so as to have sufficient
lines stored to match most patients genetically (Taylor et al.,
2005). Moreover, they have derived additional hESC lines to
address the finding that hESCs accumulate genetic and epige-
netic alterations as they are passaged, raising long-term con-
cerns about their suitability for therapeutic use (Maitra et al.,
2005). The derivation of new hESC lines from embryos known
or likely to carry mutations provides investigators with an oppor-
tunity to create research models of many human genetic dis-
eases that could also be employed for screening new drugs
(Pickering et al., 2005; Eiges et al., 2007). Different hESC lines
have a range of properties that make some especially useful
for particular research purposes, while confident generalizations
require experiments on multiple lines.
The recent development of induced pluripotent stem (iPS)
cells from differentiated human somatic cells (e.g., Takahashi
et al., 2007; Park et al., 2008) has not obviated the need for
additional hESC lines for research (Hyun et al., 2007). The ran-
dom insertion of multiple transgenes, including oncogenes in
some instances, into the genome via the sort of retroviral integra-
tion that somatic cell reprogramming currently requires may mu-
tate endogenous genes in unpredictable, cell line-specific ways,
making it questionable whether the resulting iPS lines can be
safely used for clinical purposes (Hyun et al., 2007). Uncertainty
remains about what cell types can be transformed to iPS cells,
how pluripotent or tumorigenic the human iPS cell lines are,
and whether they are sufficiently proliferative and stable to be416 Cell Stem Cell 2, May 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.useful for therapeutic purposes (Pera, 2008). Developmental
biologists depend on hESCs to perform experimental investiga-
tions of early embryonic development that may not be possible
using iPS cells. Moreover, epigenetic changes that occur during
early embryonic development can be recapitulated as hESCs
differentiate, but may not even occur in iPS cell lines (e.g., Eiges
et al., 2007). For such reasons, research on hESC lines, including
new lines, will not be displaced by that on iPS lines in the foresee-
able future and remains important for ongoing stem cell research
and the development of potential therapies.
Fresh embryos have provided a source of hESC lines ever
since the inception of hESC research (Thomson et al., 1998).
The use of surplus fresh embryos from assisted reproduction
technology (ART) clinics for the production of such lines, how-
ever, has recently been called into question. At issue is whether
fresh embryos provide a useful source of hESC lines, whether
donors of surplus fresh embryos have sufficient time to provide
an informed consent to such donation, whether it is in the inter-
ests of women to forgo freezing such embryos, and whether
patients might be pressured into donating surplus fresh embryos
by reproductive specialists. Here we address the ethical and
policy issues related to the use of fresh human embryos for
hESC research, including those of subclinical quality, in excess
of patient need derived during in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment.
Dearth of Guidelines on the Use of Fresh Embryos
as a Source of New hESC Lines
The major source of new hESC lines internationally has been sur-
plus embryos in excess of clinical need donated by those who
have completed an IVF cycle. With controlled ovarian stimula-
tion, more embryos can be generated in one IVF cycle than
can be safely transferred without increasing the risks posed to
patients and future children (Hoffman et al., 2003). In order to re-
duce these risks, assisted reproduction oversight bodies and
professional societies in several countries require or recommend
that a limited number of embryos be transferred for implantation
in any one IVF cycle (e.g., United Kingdom, Human Fertilisation
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As a result, some couples and individuals have surplus embryos
remaining after the completion of an IVF cycle. Some among
them choose to donate these embryos for hESC research.
Fresh, as well as frozen, embryos have been included in the
cohort of donated embryos. Fresh embryos were among the em-
bryos from which Thomson and colleagues derived the first
hESC lines (Thomson et al., 1998) and were also the source of sev-
eral other lines approved for federally funded research in the United
States (see National Institutes of Health). A recent report from the
United Kingdom indicates that fresh embryos constitute the pre-
ponderance of embryos used for hESC research in that country
(Chris O’Toole, Presentation to British Medical Research Council,
November 27, 2007). Stem cell lines have also been derived from
fresh embryos by investigators in several other countries, including
Australia (cell lines initiated in Singapore), Belgium, Canada, China,
Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Recently, the question of whether to allow the donation and
use of fresh embryos for the derivation of new hESC lines has
been raised in several countries, including Australia (see Austra-
lian Senate), Canada (Nisker and White, 2005), and Switzerland
(Jaconi, Human ESC Research in Switzerland). Debate about
this issue has primarily focused on concerns about informed con-
sent, the protection of women’s interests, and the prevention of
conflicts of interests on the part of reproductive specialists treat-
ing patients undergoing IVF. International policy approaches to
the donation of fresh embryos for this purpose vary considerably.
While some jurisdictions allow the donation and use of fresh
embryos for stem cell research (see Canadian Institutes of Health
Research; Portuguese Law No. 32/2006; South Korean Bioethics
and Biosafety Act; Swedish Genetic Integrity Act; UK Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Act), others have restricted the dona-
tion of fresh embryos for such research to those not suitable for
implantation (see Australian Legislation; Estonian Legislation).
Prohibitions regarding the donation and use of fresh embryos
are in force in several jurisdictions. These range from general
bans on embryo donation (e.g., German Parliament) to provisions
restricting the donation and use of embryos to those that are
cryopreserved (e.g., Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic;
Japanese Government).
To date, Canada is the only country that has adopted a specific
and comprehensive model for oversight of research proposals in
which hESC lines are to be derived from either surplus fresh or
frozen embryos. The Human Pluripotent Stem Cell Research
Guidelines of the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (see
Canadian Institutes of Health Research) are administered and
explicated by its Stem Cell Oversight Committee (SCOC). (Five
of the authors of this article are current or former members of
the SCOC.) These guidelines permit research to study hESC
lines derived from human embryos created but no longer
required for reproductive purposes, as well as preexisting
hESC lines. They offer a model for ethical oversight of research
proposals involving the use of surplus fresh embryos remaining
after the completion of IVF treatment in hESC research that could
be of assistance to stem cell oversight bodies in other countries.
Fresh Embryos as a Source of hESC Lines
It has been proposed that frozen-thawed embryos are superior
to their fresh counterparts as a source of hESC lines (Baylisand McInnes, 2007). This claim is based on a study in which
investigators found that frozen-thawed embryos gave rise to
hESC lines at a rate 2.6 times higher than when fresh embryos
were used (p = 0.09) (Sjo¨gren et al., 2004). However, because
the two cohorts used in this study were dissimilar in quality,
these data do not demonstrate the superiority of frozen embryos
over fresh embryos. When embryos that had progressed to blas-
tocyst stage were used in this study, the difference in rate of
production of hESC lines between fresh (lower quality) and
frozen-thawed (higher quality) embryos was eliminated. The de-
finitive study needed to determine whether it is technically pref-
erable to use fresh or frozen-thawed embryos to generate hESC
lines would involve a controlled comparison of the use of large
samples of both fresh and frozen-thawed embryos of similar
quality. Such a study has not been reported in the scientific
peer-reviewed literature to date.
While it is clear from the above that fresh embryos are an
adequate source of hESCs, retrospective consideration of the
literature suggests that they may offer technical advantages.
There is an extensive literature on efforts to reduce the cellular
damage caused by freezing and thawing of embryos, with the
goal being to achieve IVF pregnancy rates for surviving embryos
comparable to that of fresh embryos (Veeck et al., 2004). Ap-
proximately 35% of frozen embryos do not survive the freeze-
thaw process (Hoffman et al., 2003). Thus, more embryos would
be required to produce each hESC line from frozen-thawed
embryos than from fresh embryos if their rates of production
per embryo are the same, as indicated by Sjo¨gren et al. (2004).
It is important to note that hESC lines have been produced
from donated fresh embryos that were arrested or assessed as
of low quality (Mitalipova et al., 2003; Sjo¨gren et al., 2004; Chen
et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2006; Lerou et al., 2008). A substantial
rate of success of production of hESC lines has been reported for
fresh blastocysts considered clinically unsuitable for ART based
on morphological assessment (Lerou et al., 2008). Because
about half of the embryos produced for ART are of low morpho-
logical quality and are normally discarded, hundreds of thou-
sands are thus potentially available for research (Lerou et al.,
2008), far more than the number of potentially available cryopre-
served embryos (Hoffman et al., 2003; Barratt et al., 2004).
With the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) to IVF embryos, some embryos with a healthy appearance
will be discarded for genetic reasons. These embryos can pro-
vide excellent sources of hESC cell lines that are useful for
research on genetic diseases (e.g., Pickering et al., 2005).
The proven utility of fresh embryos—including those deemed
qualitatively unsuitable for clinical use at ART clinics—for the
derivation of hESCs provides a rationale for developing policies
for the ethical use of fresh embryos. A regulatory framework for
the use of these embryos, particularly with regard to obtaining
consent of donors, is thus required.
Why Some Patients Choose Not to Freeze
Surplus Fresh Embryos
Although most couples and individuals undergoing ART choose
to freeze all of their surplus fresh embryos (Elford et al., 2004;
Bankowski et al., 2005), some decide to freeze only some of
them. They can choose to discard the remaining fresh embryos
or to donate them for hESC research. (Fresh embryos are notCell Stem Cell 2, May 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 417
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for three months to prevent transmission of disease.) Some
choose to donate the remaining fresh embryos for hESC re-
search (Choudhary et al., 2004). Others elect not to freeze any
of their remaining fresh embryos and instead donate all of
them for hESC research (Choudhary et al., 2004; Lysdahl et al.,
2006). They may do so for one or more of the following reasons.
Fresh embryos are transferred, in part, on the basis of their
quality, which is assessed according to morphological charac-
teristics, cleavage stage, cleavage rates, degree of cytoplasmic
fragmentation, and other factors (Baczkowski et al., 2004; Sjo¨-
blom et al., 2006). Priority for transfer is given to embryos that
are considered of optimal quality, as their use results in a higher
rate of implantation and successful pregnancy. Some couples
and individuals with surplus fresh embryos of suboptimal quality
decide not to freeze them because it seems unlikely that they
could be used successfully in future IVF cycles. Instead of dis-
carding them, they choose to donate them for hESC research.
Others are concerned about the possible damaging effects that
the freeze-thaw process might have on surplus embryos and
therefore on the health of any children who might result from their
use in a subsequent IVF cycle (Svanberg et al., 2001). For this
reason, some among them elect not to cryopreserve surplus em-
bryos for future use and, rather than discard them, donate them all
for hESC research. Others undergo IVF treatment in order to avoid
knowingly passing a serious genetic disease to their children. In
these instances, the resulting embryos are screened by means
of PGD and only those that do not carry the disease genotype
of concern are transferred. The remaining fresh embryos that
are not used for reproductive purposes may provide useful sour-
ces of hESCs for research models of the relevantgenetic diseases
(Barratt et al., 2004; Pickering et al., 2005; Eiges et al., 2007; see
also Australian Senate). Some couples and individuals decide to
donate them for this purpose.
Still other couples and individuals elect to forgo freezing sur-
plus fresh embryos for personal reasons and instead donate all
of their remaining fresh embryos for hESC research. Some, for
instance, believe that they will be too old to have children in
the future and therefore refrain from cryopreserving remaining
fresh embryos, regardless of their quality (Dickens and Cook,
2007). Some among them elect to donate them for hESC
research. Others cannot meet the financial costs of embryo cryo-
preservation, annual storage, and the thawing and transfer of
embryos in future IVF cycles. They therefore cannot freeze any
remaining fresh embryos, no matter what their quality, but
some donate them for hESC research (Choudhary et al., 2004).
The inability of financially disadvantaged IVF patients and their
spouses or partners to freeze their surplus fresh embryos raises
wider social issues related to equity of access and resource allo-
cation that are beyond the scope of this article. However, it is im-
portant to observe that the use of spare fresh embryos donated
by those who cannot afford to freeze them does not involve their
financial exploitation by those who request their consent for such
donation, since the latter have not placed the former in their eco-
nomic position. These couples and individuals have been offered
ART services to address their childlessness, not in order to
harvest their fresh embryos for research. Because they are finan-
cially constrained, they have a narrower range of disposition
options than those who are not, since they cannot freeze their418 Cell Stem Cell 2, May 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.remaining fresh embryos. To deny them another option, the
option of donating these fresh embryos to hESC research, and
to force them to discard these embryos or donate them to others
who could afford to freeze them in order to protect them from
putative exploitation by those seeking their consent for the dona-
tion of these embryos for research would be stigmatizing and
discriminatory.
Some decide not to cryopreserve surplus fresh embryos be-
cause they oppose embryo freezing on ethical, religious, and/
or cultural grounds, although they may not be opposed to
hESC research in itself (Choudhary et al., 2004; Chen et al.,
2005). For instance, within the Islamic tradition, hESC research
is allowed (El-Gendy, 2005). Certainty of genetic/paternal lineage
in this tradition is critical. Consequently, embryo donation to
other couples is prohibited (El-Gendy, 2005). In addition, there
is concern about the mistaken use or fraudulent misappropria-
tion of stored embryos. Islamic couples may therefore on
religious grounds refuse embryo freezing, but approve fresh
embryo donation for hESC research.
For these and other reasons, what has been termed ‘‘a fair
number’’ of couples and individuals knowingly and voluntarily
choose not to freeze their remaining fresh embryos and elect
to donate them for hESC research (Barratt et al., 2004).
Special Ethical Concerns Addressed by Canadian
Guidelines for the Use of Surplus Fresh Embryos
in hESC Research
Three major ethical concerns have been raised about the use of
surplus fresh embryos as a source of hESC lines: whether there
is sufficient time for patients and their spouses or partners to
make an informed decision to donate such embryos, whether
this practice runs contrary to the interests of women who donate
such embryos, and whether potential donors might be subjected
to undue pressure or coercion from their treating physician to
donate fresh embryos.
Whether There Is Sufficient Time to Decide
to Donate Fresh Embryos
Given the need to obtain and use fresh embryos for hESC
research rapidly once they have been developed, some express
concern that those who have just completed an egg retrieval for
IVF do not have sufficient time (3–5 days) to make an informed
choice about whether to donate surplus fresh embryos for hESC
research (Nisker and White, 2005; Baylis and McInnes, 2007; see
also Australian Senate). These commentators argue that such
couples and individuals must make a hasty decision that they
might later come to regret.
That couples and individuals might have insufficient time to
decide about the disposition of surplus fresh embryos would
be of concern if they could only make a choice about the dona-
tion of such embryos for hESC research after the completion of
an IVF egg retrieval. To avoid the need to make a rapid decision
at that time, the Canadian SCOC guidelines require that patients
follow a two-stage consent process for determining the disposi-
tion of surplus embryos.
The first stage of this consent process takes place prior to the
initiation of any IVF treatment when couples or individuals meet
with a fertility specialist to discuss their situation. They must be
informed at this time that fresh embryos might remain at the
completion of the upcoming IVF cycle and make a preliminary
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embryos: to cryopreserve them, donate them to another couple,
donate them for research, or discard them.
The second stage of the consent process outlined in the Cana-
dian guidelines occurs after some embryos have been trans-
ferred and patients and their spouses or partners must make
a decision about the disposition of any embryos that remain.
At this time, patients are required, not just allowed, by the Cana-
dian SCOC guidelines to review their earlier decision and either
to confirm or to change it. Only if they choose not to freeze and
not to destroy their surplus fresh embryos can they elect to make
them available for pluripotent stem cell research. Thus, the final
decision to donate surplus embryos for research is not made
until after the disposition decision has been made.
These stipulations of the Canadian stem cell guidelines honor
the right of patients to control the disposition of their surplus em-
bryos and, by instituting a process that gives them a period of
time that can amount to several months in which to decide about
this, avoid the need for them to make a hasty choice about the
disposition of their surplus fresh embryos.
Whether the Donation of Fresh Embryos Is Contrary
to the Interests of Women
Another ethical objection raised against the donation of surplus
fresh embryos for hESC research is that to allow this practice
would not be in the best interests of women donors, since they
would no longer have cryopreserved embryos remaining for
subsequent IVF attempts and would thus decrease their future
chances of pregnancy (Nisker and White, 2005; Baylis and
McInnes, 2007). Critics of the use of fresh embryos point out
further that women who decide not to cryopreserve surplus
embryos and instead choose to donate them for hESC research
would have to undergo the onerous process of ovarian stimula-
tion and egg retrieval once again should they undertake addi-
tional IVF cycles in the future. This, they maintain, is contrary to
the interests of these women. Some among these commentators
also hold that because physicians are required by their profes-
sional code of ethics to attend to the best interests of their
patients, and allowing the donation of surplus fresh embryos to
research is not in the best interests of IVF patients, it is contrary
to professional ethics to secure the donation of fresh embryos
from women for hESC research (Nisker and White, 2005).
However, because such patients have decided for medical
and/or personal reasons, such as those discussed above, that
they will not store embryos surplus to their current reproductive
requirements in order to have them available for future IVF treat-
ments, they do not inadvertently narrow their future treatment op-
tions by donating their surplus fresh embryos for hESC research.
Moreover, the denial of information to patients for fear they might
use it to make choices that appear to be against their interests in-
vokes a now-discredited paternalistic approach to patient care
that would deny patients the scope to make decisions medically
considered contrary to their good (Cohen et al., 2008). To decide
against offering them the option of donating surplus fresh em-
bryos for hESC research would be to deny the moral imperative
behind the professional requirement to treat patientswith respect.
Whether Treating Physicians Would Pressure Patients
to Donate Fresh Embryos
A closely related issue is that patients might feel obliged or
pressured to accede to a request from their treating physicianto consent to the donation of surplus fresh embryos to stem
cell investigators, as such patients are highly dependent on
that physician to assist them to have long-desired children
(Cohen, 2001). This issue is addressed by the Canadian SCOC
guidelines through a requirement that members of the health
team treating and/or counseling the patient should not be the
persons who obtain consent at the time of reconsent.
Before treatment begins, patients must make several deci-
sions about the upcoming procedure and the course of treat-
ment, including a decision about the disposition of any embryos
that might remain at the completion of the IVF cycle. Receiving
and understanding such information necessarily involves an ini-
tial interview (or interviews) with the physician responsible for
their care. Despite the best intentions, a physician especially
interested in promoting hESC research might unduly encourage
patients to donate surplus embryos to that research. This possi-
bility must be balanced against the benefit to patients of entering
into an open relationship with their physician during the course of
the upcoming IVF treatment. That balance weighs in favor of
supporting the physician-patient relationship by allowing the
treating physician to conduct the initial interview before treat-
ment. The physician has a fiduciary duty to act in the best inter-
ests of patients, and the presumption is that he or she will do so
unless the contrary is shown. The possibility that physicians will
pressure patients undergoing IVF to donate surplus fresh em-
bryos for hESC research is further lessened by the requirement
of the SCOC guidelines that the treating physician should not
be a member of the stem cell research team.
After embryo transfer, patients and their spouses or partners,
including those who have elected not to freeze any remaining
embryos, are approached once again about the disposition of
these embryos. The Canadian SCOC guidelines require that at
this time someone who is not a member of the treatment or coun-
seling team must provide them with information about the
options open to them and obtain consent from them for the
donation of their surplus embryos, if that is the option they
choose. The guidelines do not identify a specific professional
who would obtain consent at this time from potential embryo do-
nors to hESC research. In practice, the usual individual to do so
would be the director of the human IVF laboratory—a person
with knowledge of the proposed research who has no contact
with the embryo donors or responsibility for any aspect of their
clinical care or for the work of stem cell investigators. The intro-
duction of a third party need not interfere with the relationship
between patients and their treating physicians, as they have
already addressed most of the treatment-related questions
and the question of what to do with surplus embryos is not
specifically related to patients’ further treatment.
Several other bodies also recognize the need to have some-
one other than the treating physician and team request consent
to embryo donation for hESC research, including the Ethics
Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 2004) and the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority of the United
Kingdom (see HFEA). The ‘‘Sample Research Consent Form,
Embryo Donation for Stem Cell Research’’ of the International
Society for Stem Cell Research indicates that this group takes
the same stance when it maintains that ‘‘if you are undergoing
fertility treatment, your treating physician will not know whatCell Stem Cell 2, May 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 419
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to provide this information’’ (see ISSCR). There is growing agree-
ment that a trained and qualified individual with knowledge of the
proposed research who understands the risks involved and who
is not a member of the IVF treatment team should seek consent
for the donation of surplus embryos.
Thus, a clear separation is built into these guidelines between
members of the IVF treatment team and those who obtain final
consent from patients to the donation of embryos for stem cell
research, as well as between the treating physician and those
who conduct stem cell research. In order to emphasize this, as
well as other aspects of the informed consent process, the
SCOC has placed on its web site two sample consent forms
for the donation of surplus embryos for hESC research that track
the Canadian guidelines, one relevant to the donation of cryopre-
served embryos and the other to the donation of fresh embryos
(see Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Stem Cell Oversight
Committee). These reaffirm not only the requirements of these
guidelines specifically discussed here, but also several other
requirements. Among these are that patients must be informed
that no personal identifiers will be provided to stem cell investi-
gators (except if the research involves autologous donation);
that they have a right to withdraw at any time before an anony-
mized cell line is created; that the proposed research could result
in the production of a stem cell line that could be maintained for
many years, distributed to other parts of the world, and used for
various research purposes; and that they will not benefit finan-
cially from any further commercialization of cell lines or be able
to direct the donation of cell lines to particular individuals.
The major ethical and policy issues raised by the donation of
surplus fresh embryos for hESC research can therefore be
addressed by (1) providing a two-stage consent process that
offers an adequate amount of time for couples and individuals
to decide about whether to donate such embryos; (2) supporting
the right of women undergoing IVF to be informed of the options
available, including the option of donating fresh embryos to
research, and to decide among them freely on the basis of their
beliefs and values; and (3) avoiding the possibility that potential
embryo donors might be subjected to undue pressure from
treating physicians by specifying that (a) the treating physician
and team, as well as the counseling team, are prohibited from
requesting the donation of such embryos at the second stage
of the consent process and that (b) the treating physician must
not be a member of a stem cell research team. These require-
ments of the Canadian SCOC guidelines, along with several
other requirements that they set out, protect the rights and inter-
ests of those who elect to make a voluntary and informed choice
to donate surplus fresh embryos for hESC research.
Conclusion
The option of using surplus fresh embryos of both good and poor
quality in research directed toward developing a greater number
of hESC lines is attractive because of the demonstrated effec-
tiveness of their use as a source of such lines. Large numbers
of fresh embryos that are not clinically useful because of poor as-
sessed quality are potentially available for the production of such
lines. The use of fresh embryos for this purpose, however, raises
ethical and policy challenges regarding the respectful treatment
of those undergoing ART treatment who wish to donate surplus420 Cell Stem Cell 2, May 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc.fresh embryos for hESC research; these challenges must be
addressed if public confidence in both ART treatment and
hESC research is to be maintained.
The Canadian pluripotent stem cell guidelines, with their two-
stage consent process for the donation of embryos, respect for
informed patient choice, and safeguards against coercion,
address the ethical and policy challenges raised by the prospect
of fresh embryo donation for hESC research in ways that protect
the rights, interests, and well-being of embryo donors. Thus,
these guidelines provide such donors and the public with the
option of making a well-considered and voluntary decision about
the donation of surplus fresh embryos for hESC research. More-
over, they offer a model for ethical oversight of the donation of
fresh embryos for this research that is available to oversight bod-
ies in other countries. Fresh human embryos in excess of patient
need remaining after the completion of IVF treatment can pro-
vide a scientifically viable and ethically justifiable source of
hESC lines when such guidelines are followed.
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